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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARY LOUISE GERARD, 
Pla;i,ntifj-Respondent, 
-vs.-






STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff, as lessor of a caf e to defendants, sought 
caneellation of the lease on the grounds that defendants 
were gambling and allowing gambling at the cafe by pay-
ing off on punch boards and pinballs, both before and 
after service of notices to desist from the gambling or 
to quit the premises. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiff was granted Summary Judgment against 
the defendants cancelling the lease between them and 
awarding plaintiff damages for unlawful detainer. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks affirmation of the judgment of tlie 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants were paying off bettors and punchboard8 
and pinball machines at a cafe which they had leased 
from plaintiff. The cafe is situate at 890 West 2100 
South, Salt Lake County, Utah. (Since filing of the Uom-
plaint the property has been annexed by Salt Lake City.) 
The lease provided in part: 
"It is understood and agreed that the said leased 
premises shall be occupied and used as a restau-
rant and cafe only, and for no other purposr what-
ever, and the Youngs agree to conduct said busi-
ness strictly in compliance with law." 
On April 12, 1966, plaintiff served writtrn notirc 
on defendants that they must stop the gambling or f]uit 
the cafe (R. 4). This notice was based, by its terms, 
both on the above terms of the lease and on 78-36-3(5) 
UCA, 1953. Defendants ignored the notice and conti11-
ued their gambling, as admitted by their Answer whirh 
states in part, '' ... defendants admit receipt of notice 
and that they disregarded its contents (R. 8)." Then'-
after plaintiff accepted no further rents. On April lG, 
1966, and again on May 15, 1966, when the rents became 
due, plaintiff refused them, advising defendants that she 
would not accept rents until and unless they desisted 
from gambling. Defendants not having done so, plain-
tiff then served notice to quit on .June 6, 1966 (R. 6), 
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and when the time for that notice had run without com-
plia11cc hy defendants, Complaint was filed on June 13, 
1%n (R 1). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT DEFEND-
ANTS HAD GAMBLING AT THE CAFE BE-
FORE AND AFTER SERVICE OF NOTICE 
TO DESIST AND THE FILING OF THE COM-
PLAINT. 
The plaintiff's positive evidence is contained in the 
nffidavits filed in support of her motions for summary 
judgment. The affidavit of Evan Holladay indicates a 
co11tinuous course of gambling as part of defendant's 
business (R. 16). The affidavits of Bryant Hanson (R.17), 
and Larry A. Hanson (R. 18), give evidence of specific 
instancrs of gambling even after filing of the Complaint. 
Tlw defendants' pleadings concern a point clearly 
within the factual knowledge of the defendants - that 
they either did or did not, as part of their business, pay 
off on their punchboards and pinballs to winning players. 
Despite many pleadings, the defendants have still 
neither admitted nor denied the gambling. Their Answer 
states, ''Defendants admit receipt of notice and that 
they disregarded the same," (R. 8). If they had not 
been gnmhling as part of their business, they would have 
hatl an automatic compliance with the notices. The 
A irnwrr further states, "If plaintiff proves that defend-
3 
ants maintained pinball machines as gambling deviees 
and punchboards as gambling devices, which is dt· 
nied ... " (R. 8). This statement is also a non sequitur. 
If they weren't gambling, why should they say plaintiff 
might prove that they were 7 If they were gambling, and 
this being a fact of which the defendants had to be aware 
' why did they deny it in their pleading? 
The answer seems to violate R. 11, URCP, and to be 
an admission of gambling under R 8 (b) and (d), URCP, 
Deseret Savings Book v. Walker et al., 78 Utah 241, 
248, 2P. 2d 609, holding on issue of non-specific denial 
of facts within pleader's knowledge, ''There was no spr-
cific denial of the facts alleged in paragraph 6 of the 
Complaint, and that it must therefor be assumed that 
such facts were admitted. In that event no evidence of 
their existence was necessary to support the findings of 
such facts by the court." 
Defendants' subsequent pleadings followed the same 
course and might have exhausted the patience of the 
court. 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
based on the pleadings and the aforesaid affidavits (R. 
14, 15). Defendants' reply was an affidavit which did 
not deny that defendants used the cafe for gambling pur-
poses, nor even that specific payoffs as alleged had beC'n 
made. Their affidavit stated only that they had no recol-
lection of the specific payoffs alleged by plaintiff (R. 23, 1 
24). The court promptly entered Judgment agaii.tst 
defendants. Defendants, without any notice to plain-
4 
tiff, JH'C\'ailed on the trial court to set aside the Judg-
ment (R. 30), on the grounds that defendants' pleadings 
were ''a mistake of counsel, George E. Bridwell, and 
such should not be given efficacy to penalize substantive 
rights of defendants" (R. 29). 
On dose reading, however, defendants' affidavit in 
support of their motion to set aside (R. 26), does not 
deny a course of business including gambling, but only 
again that they do not recall the specific payoffs alleged 
hy the Hansons' affidavits (R. 17, 18), and that as to the 
affidavit of Evan Holladay alleging a continuous course 
of gambling (R. 16), Holladay might be a liar. The 
clear inference from defendant's affidavits is that they 
gambled so often that they can't remember who they 
paid. 
Plaintiff then took defendant Preston Young's depo-
sition (R. 60). Pages 3 through 6 of the deposition are a 
list of questions concerning whether the defendants main-
tained pinballs and punchboards at the cafe for gam-
bling (Depos. 3, 4), both before and after notice to desist 
and the filing of the Complaint, and as to whether both 
before and after notice the defendant was paying off the 
winners (Depos. 4-6). Defendant Preston Young re-
fused to answer all questions based on the Fifth Amend-
ment. 
Plaintiff then filed a new Motion for Summary Judg-
ment (R 36, 37). The Motion pointed out that defend-
ants had still refused in their pleadings to admit or deny 
the facts and that in the deposition the Fifth Amend-
5 
ment was taken. Because defendants had C'Omplained 
of collusion between plaintiff's affiants, plaintiff, in Ju.
1 
motion, volunteered to have the affiants and ~~ddiL' 
Davies, one of the persons who had received payoffs, 
present at the hearing. They did appear and defendant 
chose not to examine them. Defendant Preston Youn~\ 
deposition was published and plaintiff again was girPn 
Summary Judgment. 
The evidence summarized shows a course of gam-
bling by defendants at all times. It shows that de-
fendants still evade an answer to this issue in their plearl-
ings. It show that the defendant Preston Young, re-
fused to answer concerning gambling, based on self-
incrimination at his deposition, even though he was then 
aware that such refusal would be a basis for the C'ourt 
to infer that he had been using the cafe for gamhling 
purposes (Depos. 5, 6). State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 48n, 
220 P. 704, states, although in a criminal case," ... Wlien 
he voluntarily testified he is subject to the same rules as 
other witnesses, and his failure to deny a material fact 
within his knowledge previously testified to against him 
warrants the inference that it is true." 20 Am .. Jur., E1'i-
dence §190, pp. 193-194. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS' GAMBLING OPERATION AT 
THE CAFE WAS A PROPER GROUND FOR 
TERMINATION OF THEIR LEASE. 
Defendants' gambling was unlawful. Their hrief al-
leges that the gambling statutes of Utah are void ;ind 
6 
~o 1heir gambling was legal. This overlooks the general 
prohihition against gambling contained in Art. 6 §27, 
Utah Constitution, and implemented by anti-gambling 
ordinances of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County. 
'rhe eaf e was situate in Salt Lake County at the 
time this lawsuit was started. It is now in Salt Lake City 
by annexation. Salt Lake County acted under the au-
thority giwn it by the State Legislature in 17-5-35 UCA, 
195~ (Police, building, and sanitary regulations - Power 
to make) and 17-5-77 UCA, 1953 (Ordinances - Power 
to Enact - Penalty for Violation). 
4-10-1, Salt Lake County Ordinances, Revised 1953, 
prohibits gambling in the county by language which cov-
rrs pinball and punchboard payoffs. 
''All gambling and gaming of every kind and de-
scription by playing of cards, dice, faro, rou-
lPtte, keno, poker, slot machines, devices known 
as trade machines, or any like machines or de-
Yices by whatever name kno",'Tl, or any contriv-
ance or device by or with which money, merchan-
dise or anything of value may be bet, staked, 
hazarded, won or lost, upon chance, or at any 
other game or scheme of chance whatever, and by 
betting on the results of horse races or on the 
rr~mlt of any contest, skill or endurance of men 
or animals bv means of book-making, pools, turn 
exchanges o~ other devices, for money or other 
property or thing of value within the county is 
l1erf'IJy declared unlawful." 
4-10-2, Salt Lake County Ordinances, revised 1953, 
r1Pfi11Ps a g-amhling house without reference to frequency 
7 
of the gambling, and makes it unlawful for either a les-
see or a lessor of property to allow it to b<> use(l for 
gambling, 
"UNLAWFUL TO KEEP OR MAINTAIN GAMBLIK(; 
HousE. It shall be unlawful for any person to con-
duct, keep or maintain a house, building, room or 
other place where any of the games or schemeR 
herein prohibited are carried on, conducted or op-
erated. It shall be unlawful for any person know-
ingly to permit or suffer any of the games or 
schemes herein declared unlawful to be carried on 
or kept, maintained or operated in any house, 
building, room or other place owned by him in 
whole or in part or by him leased or let to any 
other person.'' 
1-1-6 Salt Lake County Ordinances, Revised 1953, make 
the above offenses misdemeanors. 
The legislature by 10-8-41, UCA, 1953, gave a simi-
lar power to Salt Lake City, and the city enacted ordi-
nances comparable to those of Salt I.Jake Count;· hy 
17-1-4, 6, Salt Lake City Ordinances. 
The gambling being unlawful, did plaintiff have 
grounds for termination of the lease? 
Defendant relies on this point on the case of Keat 
ing v. Preston, 108 P. 2d 479 (Calif.). In that case the· 
lessor's attempt to terminate a lease was denied al-
though the lessee was permitting gambling. That case, 
however, was conditioned on two points, first that the 
lease didn't prohibit the conduct, and second that thei:r 
was no statutory provision that made the conduct a basi> 
for lease forfeiture. 
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In the instant case as to the first point above, the 
Jrasr provides: 
"It is understood and agreed that the said leased 
premises shall be occupied and used as a restau-
rant and cafe only, and for no other purpose what-
Pver, and the Youngs agree to conduct said busi-
ness strictly in compliance with law." (R. 2) 
As to the second point, 78-36-3, UCA, 1953, pro-
vides: 
"UNLAWFUL DETAINER BY TENANT FOR TERM 
LESS THAN LIFE. - A Tenant of real property, for 
a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful de-
tainer: 
( 4) When he assigns or sublets the leased 
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or 
commits or permits waste thereon, or when he 
sets up or carries on therein or thereon mny un-
lwwful business, or when he suffers, permits or 
maintains on or about said premises any nuisance, 
and remains in possession after service upon him 
of a three days' notice to quit; or, 
( 5) When he continues in possession, in person 
nr by subtenant, after neglect or failure to per-
form any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the vroperfy is held, other 
than those hereinbef ore mentioned, (J;nd after 'IW-
tice in writin,q requiring in the alternative the 
11erformance of such conditions or covenant or the 
surrender of the property, serYed upon him, and, 
if there is a subtenant in actual occupation of 
the premises, also upon surh subtenant, shall re-
mai-n 1111.complied u-ith for five days after service 
thereof. Within three days after the servire of the 
notire the tenant, or any subtenant in actual occu-
pation of the premises, or any mortgagee of the 
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term, or other person interested in its contirnrnnep 
may perform such condition or covenant an(l 
there??T save the lease from forfeiture; provided, 
that if the covenants and conditions of the J ... 1. · l · "' Rr v10 atecl by the lesse_e cannot afterwards hi! per-
formed, then no notice as last prescribed herri11 
need be given." (Emphasis added) · 
It should be noted that while the unlawfnl cletaiiwr 
statutes have a number of precise conditions coneernina 
·' 
due notice, that defendants have stated no point denying 
proper notice at any point in the proceedings before the 
trial court or this court. 
Is the gambling of sufficient substance to justify 
lease termination? The facts show a continuous course 
of gambling. While the affidavits of the Hansons (R. li-
19) relate only isolated instances, the Complaint charges 
a course of gambling and of mainta.ining rnachi11es for 
that purpose at the cafe, as does the affidavit of Vivan 
Holladay (R. 16). As stated in Point I, these allega-
tions not having been denied are deemed admitted. 
The gambling is substantial when viewed from plain-
tiff's eyes because, as lessor, she herself is liable to crimi-
nal prosecution if she allows gambling on the premise> 
she has leased. 76-27-3 UCA, 1953, and 4-10-2, Salt Lake 
County Ordinances, Revised, 1953. The defendantR ha\'-
ing refused to desist, she has the duty of forcing thC'm t.o. 
which this lawsuit hopes to do. The rulr is stated rn 
Zotalis v. Cannellos Pt al., 164 NW 807 (Minn.), whicli 
held shaking dice for cigars was grounds for leasr ter-
mination based on a lease term against gamhling: 
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"The viola ti on of a condition in the lease cannot 
be said to be trivial when the violation is of such 
a character that the lessor may be subjected to a 
criminal prosecution therefore.'' 
Finally, 78-36-3(5) UCA, 1953, makes no distinction 
between great and small breaches of a lease, nor is there 
a Utah case on this point. To satisfy this statute what is 
rrquired is only that a breach be proved and that after 
notice given pursuant to the statute, that the breach con-
tinue. On this there is no argument on the facts as 
evidenced hy the unrebutted affidavits of Bryant and 
Larry A. Hanson as to payoffs, on May 21, 1966, and 
.June :.!, 1966 (R. 17-19), with notice under 78-3-36(4)& 
(5) UCA, 1953, previously served on April 12, 1966 
(R. 4, 5). Gilbert v. Peck, 121 P. 315 (Calif.); 32 Am. 
Jur., Landlord and Tenant, ~864, pp. 731; 100 ALR 2d 
469 ct :,;fl<I. 
CONCLUSION 
It is resprctfully submitted that the summary judg-
ment is well supported by the facts and law and should 
he affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K. SAMUEL KING 
Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondent 
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